A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the Revenue Side by Hsu, Shi-Ling
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 65 Number 4 Article 4 
8-1-2017 
A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the 
Revenue Side 
Shi-Ling Hsu 
Florida State University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shi-Ling Hsu, A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the Revenue Side, 65 Buff. L. Rev. 857 
(2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol65/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
 
 
   
    
  
 
           
        
       
       
       
          
        
    
        
          
      
        
           
         
             
           
            
        
        
          
        
         
     
      
 
         
           
              
              
          
         
            
         
A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: 
Considering the Revenue Side
SHI-LING HSU† 
ABSTRACT
Climate policy in the United States always seems to face
strong political headwinds. It is not so much that voters dismiss 
the threat of climate change, or that they believe climate change is
a “hoax,” but coming up with a fair and effective policy has always
seemed so daunting. This Article argues that the simplest answer 
is not, contrary to initial appearances, daunting at all. The most
effective and most efficient climate policy at the federal, state, and
local level is a carbon tax.
Carbon taxation has always seemed politically implausible,
due in large part to an inherent public aversion to taxes, but also
due to a campaign of misinformation, paralleling the campaign
against climate change itself. An important way of countering this
bias and this campaign is to emphasize the revenue side of carbon
taxation. Without a robust discussion of the uses of carbon tax
revenues, the only salient part of a carbon tax to voters is the all-
too-apparent cost. There is no sense of the benefits of revenues.
This Article fills this gap by presenting a menu of revenue
options, along with a discussion of the macroeconomic and the 
distributional consequences of the different options. This analysis
is an input into a political process, which must ultimately decide
on the objective, but only with the guidance of some quantitative
analysis. This Article closes with an argument for a “lump sum
distribution” approach, in which carbon tax proceeds are returned 
directly back to carbon taxpayers on a largely per-capita basis.
† D’Alemberte Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs,
Florida State University College of Law. The author would like to thank James
Handley and Gary Lucas, Jr. for their comments and help, the participants at a
workshop at the University of Florida Levin College of Law at the 2016 J.B. &
Maurice C. Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium and at the 2016 Vermont
Law School Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship, and the always-helpful
library staff at the Florida State University College of Law. The author is a
member of the Advisory Board of Citizens’ Climate Lobby.
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858 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
This approach largely insulates the poorest two-thirds from
increases in energy and other goods and may not be economically
inferior to other options as economists have historically assumed.
INTRODUCTION
Few predicted that among the many controversies
Donald Trump would court as President of the United
States, climate change would figure very prominently. But
hope that President Trump might be less dogmatic than
Candidate Trump has faded, as climate skeptics—those 
that doubt the need to address climate change1—have 
loaded their allies and staffers into key positions.2 Former
Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, who made his
name suing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency over
its climate regulations,3 is now the EPA Administrator.
Most of all, the President announced in June4 that he would
1. Labels for people that disagree with the need to address climate change
necessarily touch on sensitivities, but one label that seems to have stuck is
“skeptic.” One climate scientist that has engaged with opponents of climate
policy is former Georgia Tech professor Judith Curry, who uses the term
“skeptic.” See Michael D. Lemonick, Climate Heretic: Judith Curry Turns on
Her Colleagues, NATURE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010/
101101/full/news.2010.577.html. This label is used more freely than the more
derogatory “climate denier,” which suggests that the individual denies the very
validity of climate science.
2. Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe and Myron Ebell, who is Director of the
Center for Energy and Environment at the Competitive Enterprise Institute,
have been long-time climate skeptics, and have long vigorously fought 
regulations and laws to address climate change. They have been a major source
of personnel for the Trump Administration. See, e.g., Robin Bravender, Ebell’s
Goal: Reforms ‘President Warren’ Can’t Reverse, GREENWIRE (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060049598; Robin Bravender, Enter
the Inhofe Infantry, GREENWIRE (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/stories/1060049898/.
3. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Scott Pruitt, Testifying to Lead E.P.A.,
Criticizes Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/politics/scott-pruitt-testifying-to-lead-
epa-criticizes-environmental-rules.html?_r=0.
4. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2017, at A1.
   
      
    
       
         
     
       
      
      
      
          
          
     
     
         
          
        
      
 
           
   
 
   
 
              
    
 
                
        
 
         
            
 
              
     
       
 
          
              
   
8592017] CARBON TAXATION
withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement,5 the 
international accord to reduce greenhouse gases, and the 
first to involve global binding emissions targets.6 This sharp
turn in federal policy, along with increasingly grim news of 
rising temperatures,7 collapsing ice shelves,8 and massive 
flooding on the heels of punishing drought,9 have created a
new sense of urgency. Broad, existential worrying will make 
it difficult for the Trump Administration to bury climate 
change as a topic of discussion and dissent.
Some of this urgency and worry has spouted forth as a
call for a carbon tax.10 What else is there, now that the 
Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan—its initiative to 
curb carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector11— 
is in the hands of Scott Pruitt? But upon reflection, there is
more than just desperation in this recent push for a carbon
tax. For one thing, there is the possibility that states may
act in the absence of meaningful federal policy. There is
5. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
6. European Commission, Climate Action, Paris Agreement (June 14, 2017)
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en.
7. Jugal K. Patel, How 2016 Became Earth’s Hottest Year on Record, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/18/science/
earth/2016-hottest-year-on-record.html.
8. Jugal K. Patel, A Crack in an Antarctic Ice Shelf Grew 17 Miles in the
Last Two Months, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/02/07/science/earth/antarctic-crack.html?emc=eta1.
9. Joseph Serna, ‘Atmospheric River’ Slams California Again as State
Decides Whether to Keep Drought Restrictions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:10
PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-rain-storm-wind-20170207-
story.html.
10. See Martin S. Feldstein et. al., A Conservative Case for Climate Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2017, at A25; see generally Jerry Taylor, A Conservative
Carbon Tax, MILKEN INST. REV. (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.milkenreview.org/
articles/a-conservative-carbon-tax?IssueID=18.
11. Carbon Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
      
        
       
      
      
       
        
 
        
         
    
     
        
       
      
       
       
     
      
     
 
           
         
      
              
           
  
            
      
       
            
           
          
              
          
      
                
        
 
860 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
also a sense that with the Republican Party in full control
of the federal government, it will own federal policy.12 One 
of the cheapest and politically advantageous things an
embattled Trump Administration or GOP Congress could do 
to distract from turmoil and unrest would be to make a
positive push on climate policy and enact a federal carbon
tax.
Certainly, a carbon tax is the climate option most
consistent with libertarian values, emphasizing as it does
minimization of government intervention and the use of 
markets to promote technologies, as opposed to regulation
under the Clean Air Act and governments “picking winners
and losers.”13 Credible leaders in business and government
keep bringing it up. In his controversial advisory
relationship with the President, Tesla founder Elon Musk
was reported to have floated the idea of a carbon tax.14 Five 
prominent Republicans, including former Secretaries of 
State George Schultz and James Baker, stepped forward in
February to propose a revenue-neutral carbon tax to White 
12. See Terence Burlij, Boehner: Obamacare Repeal and Replace ‘Not What’s
Going to Happen,’ CNN (Feb. 24, 2017, 10:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/02/23/politics/john-boehner-obamacare/ (quoting John Boehner: “All this
happy talk that went on in November and December . . . about repeal . . . if you
pass repeal without replace, first, anything that happens is your fault. You 
broke it.”).
13. See Jerry Taylor, Debating Carbon Taxes with Oren Cass (and Bill
Gates), NISKANEN CTR. (Apr. 19, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/debating-
carbon-taxes-oren-cass-bill-gates/ ("Why tax rather than regulate greenhouse
gas emissions? The most straightforward reason is that leaving it to market
actors to decide where, when, and how to reduce emissions will likely prove
faster and more efficient than leaving those decisions to government
regulators . . . . Market actors are far more likely to find the right answers to 
those questions through experimentation, tested by profit and loss, than are
politicians and/or regulators informed by energy technocrats.").
14. Kevin Cirilli, Elon Musk Floated the Idea of a Carbon Tax to Trump, an
Official Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017, 11:52 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-26/tesla-s-musk-said-to-
float-idea-of-a-carbon-tax-to-trump-ceos.
   
     
        
         
       
    
   
      
       
      
     
     
     
      
      
 
            
           
           
          
         
         
          
    
             
  
        
        
            
    
          
      
           
    
          
     
       
        
       
 
        
    
8612017] CARBON TAXATION
House officials.15 Even Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in 
his former job as ExxonMobil CEO, expressed a preference 
for a carbon tax over alternatives, although that seemed
more aimed at defeating the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009,16 a cap-and-trade bill to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions.17 
An extremely broad consensus exists among
economists18 and climate experts19 that a carbon tax is the 
most economically efficient, most administratively simple,
and most effective way to reduce emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Implementing details
are important, but the core mechanism of a carbon tax—the 
unitary levy of a fee scaling with carbon dioxide 
emissions20—is the basic approach that most likely
15. The five Republicans were James Baker, former Secretary of the
Treasury and White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan; George P.
Schultz, former Secretary of State to President Reagan; Henry Paulson, former
Secretary of the Treasury to President George W. Bush; Martin Feldstein,
former Chief Economic Advisor to President Reagan; and Gregory Mankiw,
former Chief Economic Advisor to President George W. Bush. See John 
Schwartz, ‘A Conservative Climate Solution’: Republican Group Calls for a
Carbon Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2017, at A13.
16. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009).
17. See John Schwartz, Tillerson Led Exxon’s Shift on Climate Change;
Some Say ‘It Was All P.R.’, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2016, at A16.
18. See Carbon Taxes II, IGM CHICAGO (Dec. 4, 2012, 1:08 PM),
http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-taxes-ii (showing eighty seven
percent of economic experts, ninety-eight percent when weighted by confidence,
agreeing or strongly agreeing that a carbon tax of $20 would be more beneficial
than economically harmful); see also Carbon Tax, IGM CHICAGO (Dec. 20, 2011,
1:48 PM), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax (showing ninety
percent of economic experts, ninety-five percent when weighted by confidence,
agreeing or strongly agreeing that a carbon tax would reduce emissions more
efficiently than a collection of other climate policies).
19. See PETER HOWARD & DEREK SYLVAN, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, EXPERT 
CONSENSUS ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 16 (2015),
http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/ExpertConsensusReport.pdf.
20. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS
TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 15 (2011).
      
       
     
 
       
      
       
      
        
      
        
           
 
          
          
          
           
        
       
    
   
      
              
         
 
    
               
   
             
      
    
           
          
         
         
          
             
            
        
       
              
      
         
 
862 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
produces the most emissions reductions at the lowest cost
and administrative burden.21 This consensus is
bipartisan.22 
Perhaps because a carbon tax is such an effective and
efficient option, climate skeptics have waged a particularly
ferocious campaign to stamp out any attempts to enact
one.23 Economic-sounding pseudo-analyses from faux think
tanks purport to explain the costs of a carbon tax without
acknowledging any revenue collection at all, essentially
assuming that all carbon tax revenues would be gathered
together as a pile of cash and burned.24 A tax of $30 per ton
21. A somewhat close second to carbon taxation is “cap-and-trade,” the
implementation of a program to issue emissions allowances and permit holders
to trade amongst themselves for the right to emit. See, e.g., Lawrence H.
Goulder & Andrew Schein, Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review 
36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,338, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19338; The EU Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS), EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en (last visited
June 10, 2017).
22. HSU, supra note 20, at 185.
23. See Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax 28 (Tex.
A&M Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 17-18, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2915339; see also sources 
cited infra note 24.
24. See, e.g., IERDC, Do We Need a Carbon Tax?, YOUTUBE (Jul. 16, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkxPs9MOVzo (arguing that a carbon tax 
would hurt families, but making no mention of what would happen to carbon
tax revenues); Carbon Tax, INST. FOR ENERGY RES.,
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/topics/policy/carbon-tax/ (last visited June
10, 2017) (“The promise of ‘revenue neutrality’ is quite hollow, given U.S.
history. The federal income tax rate was instituted with a top tax rate of 7 
percent in 1913, which was jacked up to 77 percent by 1918. Currently, there
are numerous academic and political proposals that want to use carbon tax 
revenues to fund new programs and ‘reduce the deficit,’ leaving less available
for tax relief and meaning the carbon tax would be a net tax increase on
Americans.”); David W. Kreutzer & Nicholas D. Loris, Carbon Tax Would Raise
Unemployment, Not Swap Revenue, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.heritage.org/environment/report/carbon-tax-would-raise-
unemployment-not-swap-revenue (“Two suggestions to garner more bipartisan
support for a carbon tax have been to ensure that the tax is revenue neutral by
reducing other taxes or to replace the EPA’s regulations of greenhouse gas 
emissions with the CO2 tax. Both proposals are political impossibilities. Just
   
        
        
       
       
       
       
    
     
       
      
        
 
 
                
        
       
          
         
            
              
        
          
    
 
             
          
      
      
          
         
          
        
       
    
   
           
          
          
           
            
          
            
 
8632017] CARBON TAXATION
on the roughly 5.5 gigatons of carbon dioxide emitted in the 
U.S. each year25 would produce revenues of at least $150
billion in the first year.26 Assuming away such large 
revenues is to highlight just the cost while blacking out the 
benefits, akin to complaining about spending money on
roads and bridges without acknowledging the benefits of a
transportation system. Needless to say, these pseudo-
analyses also assume the social cost of carbon to be zero.27 
In other words, they assume that there is absolutely no 
environmental or social benefit to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions or the other pollutants that accompany fossil fuel
combustion.28 
the sniff of a new revenue stream to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars
annually has the special interests in Washington running to Congress for more
handouts. Before carbon tax legislation has even been introduced, ideas on how
to use the revenue already include income transfers, paying for defense
spending cuts, reducing the deficit, transferring money to developing countries 
to adapt to climate change and the list goes on. History shows that any time
more money comes into the coffers of the federal government, there is a political
interest to spend it one way or another.”).
25. Figure 1. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gas, 1990–2014, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2016-08/us-ghg-emissions_fig-1.csv.
26. A carbon tax might not capture every single source of carbon dioxide
emissions, although other estimates suggest that revenues could be higher. See
Feldstein et al., supra note 10.
27. The U.S. Government, through an interagency working group convened 
by the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Management and Budget,
has the estimated current “social cost of carbon”—the marginal cost to society— 
at $42 per ton of carbon dioxide. This assumes a discount rate of three percent.
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (2010),
https//obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/scc-tsd-
final-july-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC5W-JW3V]. The interagency working 
group acknowledges that this is likely an underestimate, due to the difficulty of
estimating the damages of, for example, catastrophic changes in climate. Id.
28. See, e.g., Kreutzer & Loris, supra note 24, at 1–2 (“Unilaterally reducing 
greenhouse gases would not make a dent on global emissions and, consequently,
would do next to nothing to reduce global temperatures. Even if the U.S. were 
to curb carbon emissions 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050 (what cap-and-
trade bills required), it would reduce global temperatures by only a few tenths
      
        
     
     
  
       
       
        
       
       
         
     
       
       
    
       
      
       
 
         
      
      
             
            
         
      
            
           
     
           
         
  
              
      
    
        
          
           
            
 
864 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
A complete analysis of a carbon tax requires not only
acknowledgement of the environmental and social benefits
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but some treatment
of the revenue side. This is a critical part of the analysis, 
since carbon tax revenues can be used to reduce other taxes.
In fact, carbon taxes are likely less distortionary than many 
other taxes, so that a carbon tax “swap” could be 
economically efficient, even without counting the climate
benefits.29 Reviewing and analyzing different options for
carbon tax revenues is not only important for providing the 
whole picture of carbon taxation, but for highlighting the 
important political and economic tradeoffs implicit in
revenue decisions. Disposing of $150 billion is fiscal policy
and is deeply political.
Along those lines, economic and policy analysis is
absolutely critical to making informed political judgments.
Sound analysis must do battle with the faux economics that
of a degree.”); ROBERT P. MURPHY, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, CARBON ‘TAX 
SWAP’ DEALS: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE 1 (2012),
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/IER-Murphy-
Carbon-Tax-Swap-Deals-A-Review-and-Critique.pdf (“The ‘social cost of carbon’
is not the proper benchmark to use when calibrating a carbon tax implemented
unilaterally by the U.S. government because of the problem of ‘leakage.’ That
term denotes the probability that carbon-emitting activities in a regulated
jurisdiction will be relocated to another, less-regulated jurisdiction. It is 
incorrect to count a ton of reduced U.S. emissions as providing benefits equal to
the ‘social cost of carbon,’ if the policy that causes this reduction in U.S.
emissions goes hand-in-hand with increased emissions elsewhere.”).
29. See Sebastian Rausch & John Reilly, MIT Joint Program on Sci. & Pol’y
Global Change, Carbon Tax Revenue and the Budget Deficit: A Win-win-win 
Solution? 2 (2012), http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/72548#files-area; 
Warwick McKibbin et al., The Potential Role of a Carbon Tax in U.S. Fiscal
Reform, Brookings Inst. (July 24, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
the-potential-role-of-a-carbon-tax-in-u-s-fiscal-reform/; Ian W.H. Parry &
Antonio Miguel Bento, Tax Deductions, Environmental Policy, and the “Double 
Dividend” Hypothesis, 39 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 67, 69–70 (1999); Ian W.H.
Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The
Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 51,
68–69 (1999).
   
      
       
      
    
        
        
          
     
         
     
        
       
         
       
       
     
        
       
    
        
         
       
     
 
       
              
           
 
        
          
          
      
         
 
8652017] CARBON TAXATION
have crept into climate policy.30 It is true that the likelihood
of a political debate over fiscal carbon policy being
sidetracked by ideologues and distortions is somewhere 
north of ninety-nine percent. However, the alternative is to 
throw up one’s hands and make these decisions blindly,
solely on ideological grounds, never knowing if policy does
what its proponents think it will do. As James Madison
wrote, “popular Government without popular
information . . . is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy.”31 
This Article is also important to support potential state 
and local initiatives to levy a carbon tax. Certainly, there 
are a number of deeply blue states that may take matters
into their own hands, as California did with its state global
warming law, The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.32 
In Washington State, a tiny, hand-to-mouth grassroots
organization called CarbonWA shocked the environmental
world by getting its proposed state carbon tax onto the 2016
ballot, along the way gathering 360,000 signatures, fully
five percent of the state population.33 If the federal
government remains feckless on climate policy, it is entirely
possible that a state with less toxic politics could find its
way to seeing the merits of carbon taxation, not the least of 
which could be to address budget woes.
30. See sources cited supra note 24.
31. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) reprinted in
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html.
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2014).
33. See Chelsea Harvey, It Could be the Nation’s First Carbon Tax. And
Environmentalists are Fighting Over It, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/10/17/it-
could-be-the-nations-first-carbon-tax-and-environmentalists-are-fighting-over-
it/?utm_term=.e5e7a3f2a906; Shi-Ling Hsu, Environmentalists’ Disdain for
Washington’s Carbon Tax, SLATE (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:03 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2016/10/environmenta
lists_are_against_i_732_washington_s_carbon_tax.html.
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I. CARBON TAXATION, IN CONTEXT 
Carbon taxation is not a radical new idea. The origins of 
pollution taxation date back to the early twentieth-century
writings of economist Arthur Pigou.34 A “Pigouvian tax” is a
unitary tax levied on emitters to force them to account for
the damages caused by their emissions, which are often
invisible, or “external” to the emitter.35 While actual
damages from climate change are probably nonlinear,36 a 
carbon tax that at least scales linearly with carbon dioxide 
emissions differentiates between different fossil fuels and
activities by their contributions to climate change.37 
Following the lead of Pigou, many jurisdictions in the world
have adopted carbon taxes, covering a variety of groups of 
emitters. These programs make a variety of uses of carbon
tax revenues, in a variety of different political contexts.
These examples, reviewed below, offer guidance about
revenue choices for U.S. carbon taxes at the federal, state,
or local level.
A. Where in the World Is Carbon Taxed? 
At the time this Article was being written, some form of 
a carbon tax existed in fifteen countries.38 Norway, Sweden,
34. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 131–35 (1928). Taxes that
reflected the extent of negative externality thus became known as “Pigouvian”
taxes. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21–23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
35. See TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 357 (2014).
36. See Martin L. Weitzman, What is the “Damages Function” for Global
Warming, and What Difference Might it Make? 1 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 57, 57
(2010).
37. HSU, supra note 20, at 27 ("[A]t least with respect to fossil fuels, 
measuring the amount of carbon dioxide emitted is trivial, as the carbon
content of almost any fossil fuel is known when it is extracted.").
38. Putting a Price on Carbon with a Tax, WORLD BANK (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/background-
   
        
      
     
      
      
      
         
      
        
       
    
    
       
      
      
      
 
  
         
           
  
              
     
        
    
   
        
    
 
            
       
       
              
 
       
          
     
  
   
         
 
8672017] CARBON TAXATION
Denmark and Finland all enacted national carbon taxes
from 1990 to 1992, the first countries to do so. The 
Scandinavian countries are the most aggressive in terms of 
climate policy, but the implementation of their carbon taxes
have been complicated by their membership in the 
European Union or the European Economic Area, whose 
rules prohibit pricing or taxing retail electricity in ways
that discriminate against providers from other member
states.39 Finland’s carbon tax, therefore, exempts fuels used
for electricity generation,40 and instead taxes electricity
consumption, missing an opportunity to disincentivize the 
use of fossil fuels to generate electricity.41 For the same 
reason, Sweden’s carbon tax—the world’s highest at about
$120 USD per ton of carbon dioxide42—also exempts fossil
fuels for electricity, although most of Sweden’s electricity is 
generated by nuclear or hydroelectric power.43 
note_carbon-tax.pdf [http://perma.cc/G7MK-A7YM].
39. Philipp Genschel & Markus Jachtenfuchs, How the European Union
Constrains the State: Multilevel Governance of Taxation, 50 EUR. J. POL. RES.
293, 302 (2011).
40. See, e.g., Act on Excise Duty on Electricity and Certain Fuels 1996 (Act
No. 1260/1996) (Fin.), http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1996/19961260; ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INVENTORY OF ESTIMATED BUDGETARY SUPPORT &
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FOSSIL FUELS 153–64 (2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/inventory-of-estimated-budgetary-support-and-tax-
expenditures-for-fossil-fuels-2013_9789264187610-en; STEFAN SPECK ET AL.,
NATL. ENVTL. INST. OF DEN., THE USE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN NORDIC AND 
BALTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2001–2005 at 99–113 (2006),
http://www.norden.org/da/publikationer/publikationer/2006-525/.
41. Sarianne Tikkanen, Remarks on Signs of Environmental Tax Reform in
Finland, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 330 (Hope Ashiabor et al. eds., 2006).
42. As of March 12, 2015, the Swedish Krona traded for 0.116 U.S. Dollars.
Historic Lookup, X-RATES, http://www.x-rates.com/historical/?from=USD&
amount=1&date=2015-03-12 (last visited June 24, 2017). A carbon tax of 110 kr
per kilogram of carbon dioxide translates into a carbon tax of $116 US per ton of
carbon dioxide. See Objectives and Instruments, SVENSK ENERGI, 
http://www.svenskenergi.se/Elfakta/Miljo-och-klimat/Mal-och-styrmedel/ (last
updated Apr. 14, 2016).
43. See LAG (1994 :1776) OM SKATT PÅ ENERGI (Svensk författningssamling
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European nations face other complications. Almost all
European countries are covered by the European Union
Emission Trading System (EUETS), which requires certain
industrial emitters of greenhouse gases to hold tradeable 
permits for their emissions.44 Those countries taxing
carbon—Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland—thus generally exempt
industries covered by the EUETS in order to avoid
essentially double-taxing the same emissions.45 
A second wave of carbon tax laws began in 2008, with
Switzerland46 and the Canadian province of British
Columbia47 enacting carbon taxes in 2008, Ireland48 and 
Iceland49 in 2010, Mexico50 and Japan51 in 2012, and 
[SFS] 2017 :410) (Swed.), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-
Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Lag-19941776-om-skatt-pa-en_sfs-
1994-1776/. See also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES:
SWEDEN 2013 REVIEW 3 (2013), http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2013/
sweden2013_excerpt.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Barry Anderson & Corrado Di Maria, Abatement and Allocation
in the Pilot Phase of the EU ETS, 48 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 83, 83–84 
(2011); EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 21.
45. WORLD BANK, supra note 38. Switzerland is an exception, but it has its
own trading system.
46. Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen [CO2-Gesetz],
[Federal Law on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions] Oct. 8, 1999, SR 641.71, arts.
1, 5 (Switz.), http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20091310/
index.html.
47. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c 40 (Can.).
48. Finance Act 2010 (Act No. 5/2010) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ 
pdf/2010/en.act.2010.0005.pdf.
49. Lög um umhverfis- og auðlindaskatta [Environmental and Natural
Resources Tax Act] (2016) (Ice.), http://www.althingi.is/altext/stjt/
2009.129.html.
50. Ley Federal de Derechos [LFD], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
11-12-2013 (Mex.).
51. See Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation), 
MINISTRY ENV’T GOV’T OF JAPAN, https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-
tax/20121001a_dct.pdf (last visited June 11, 2017).
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France52 and Chile53 in 2014. The taxes are modest, ranging
from about $2 USD per ton of carbon dioxide to $30 USD.54 
Almost all contain exclusions, exemptions, and other
provisions that distort economic decisions and make it
difficult to estimate their impacts on greenhouse gas
emissions. Costa Rica charges a tax of 3.5 percent of the 
market value of fossil fuels,55 an ad valorem tax that fails to 
distinguish among the divergent carbon content of coal,
natural gas, and petroleum. Chile’s carbon tax is limited to 
thermal power plants.56 Mexico taxes fossil fuels, but limits
the tax to three percent of the sales price of the fuel,
making it essentially an ad valorem tax.57 All of these 
idiosyncratic ways of taxing carbon make it difficult to 
estimate the effects of these policies, or even the effective 
carbon price.
Carbon taxes exist at the subnational level. The 
Canadian province of British Columbia has a simple,
transparent carbon tax, with few of the distortions common
in other programs. The tax ramped up from $10 CAD per
ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions in 2008 up to the 
52. Loi 2013-1279 du 29 décembre 2013 de finances rectificative pour 2013 
[Law 2013-1279 of December 29, 2013 to Amend the Budget for 2013], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
Dec. 30, 2013, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?numJO=0&
dateJO=20131230&numTexte=2&pageDebut=21910&pageFin=22188.
53. Law No. 20780 art. 8, Septiembre 29, 2014, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Chile). See Kate Galbraith, Climate Change Concerns Push Chile to Forefront
of Carbon Tax Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/business/international/climate-change-
concerns-push-chile-to-forefront-of-carbon-tax-movement.html?_r=0.
54. See sources cited supra notes 46-53.
55. PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40593, COSTA RICA:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 5 (2009).
56. See sources cited supra note 46-53.
57. Ley Federal de Derechos [LFD], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
11-12-2013 (Mex.).
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current fixed rate of $30 CAD per ton.58 The carbon tax
applies to twenty classes of fossil fuels and other specified
combustibles,59 but excludes fuels exported from British
Columbia and fuels used for inter-jurisdictional travel.60 
B. What in the World Happens to Carbon Tax Revenues? 
Globally, all carbon tax programs combined take in
about $13 billion USD annually.61 Some taxes are very
low—Japan’s carbon tax is less than $3 USD per ton of 
carbon dioxide62—and the collected revenues amount to 
about $4 per capita.63 Sweden’s carbon tax is not only the 
highest in terms of tax level, but also the largest in terms of 
revenue: $3.7 billion USD in 2013, which is about $381 per
capita or about 0.67% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).64 
Were the United States to adopt even a small federal
carbon tax—on the order of $10 per ton—it would instantly
become the largest in terms of revenues, and much larger
than all other carbon taxes in the world combined.
Very broadly and generally, carbon tax revenues can be 
put to one of three uses: (1) spending on environmental, or
climate-related projects; (2) returning money to taxpayers,
58. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c 40 (Can.) (Schedule 1).
59. Id. (Schedule 2).
60. Id. § 10.
61. Jeremy Carl & David Fedor, Tracking Global Carbon Revenues: A 
Survey of Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade in the Real World, 96 ENERGY
POL’Y 50, 53 (2016) (The figure shown in Table 2 is $21.7 billion, but that
includes $8.8 billion from an Australian pricing program that was canceled
after a change in federal government).
62. See Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation), 
MINISTRY ENV’T GOV’T OF JAPAN, https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-
tax/20121001a_dct.pdf (last visited June 11, 2017). As of February 8, 2017, 289
Japanese yen per ton of CARBON DIOXIDE is approximately $2.53 (US). See
Historic Lookup, X-RATES, http://www.x-rates.com/historical/?from=JPY&
amount=289&date=2017-02-08 (last visited June 24, 2017).
63. Carl & Fedor, supra note 61.
64. Id.
   
      
       
      
        
        
         
     
     
       
   
     
       
       
     
       
       
           
    
          
          
       
     
 
    
              
             
           
    
 
          
       
          
   
          
   
 
8712017] CARBON TAXATION
or “revenue recycling”; or (3) for general revenue purposes.65 
In purely economic terms, there is no reason not to treat 
carbon tax revenues like any other source of government
revenue,66 but the political reality seems to be that in order
to enact a carbon tax, it must be accompanied by some 
other policy that satisfies a political objective.67 Carbon tax
revenues provide a vehicle for satisfying those objectives.
Climate skeptics who pretend that carbon tax revenue 
would be burned in a bonfire68 are intentionally concealing
the necessary flipside of taxation: revenues.
Only five of the fifteen carbon taxing jurisdictions
spend revenues on environmental or climate-related uses.69 
Two—Japan and France—have very small carbon taxes and
spend one hundred percent of revenues on alternative 
energy and conservation measures,70 viewing their carbon
taxes solely as financing mechanisms. Economists generally
frown upon such a pairing, deriding it as a “belt and
suspenders” approach, preferring the elegance of a simple 
tax, set at an appropriately high level, rather dealing with
two moving parts at once.71 But pairing a carbon tax with
“green” spending has political attractions, as voters
contemplating taxes may like to believe that the additional
65. Id. at 51.
66. For arguments for deficit reduction, see, e.g., William G. Gale et al.,
Carbon Taxes as Part of the Fiscal Solution, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 12, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/carbon-taxes-as-part-of-the-fiscal-solution/; 
Jerry Taylor, Should Carbon Tax Revenue Be Used to Retire Debt?, NISKANEN
CTR. (Apr. 28, 2015), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/should-carbon-tax-revenue-
be-used-to-retire-debt/.
67. See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 66.
68. See sources cited supra note 28.
69. Carl & Fedor, supra note 61, at 53.
70. Id.
71. DONALD B. MARRON & ADELE C. MORRIS, HOW SHOULD GOVERNMENTS USE
REVENUE FROM CORRECTIVE TAXES? 10 (2016), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/77251/2000595-How-Should-Governments-Use-
Revenue-from-Corrective-Taxes.pdf.
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taxes paid are spent on something tangible and useful.72 As 
a carbon price represents an unambiguous cost to an
individual voter, pairing it with a social good to address an
environmental problem could add to its allure.73 
The four Scandinavian countries, all early adopters of a
carbon tax, all treat roughly half of their carbon tax
revenues as general government revenues.74 As these taxes
have all been in place for almost thirty years,75 there is less
political impetus for compensating disadvantaged parties;
carbon taxes have been baked into prices for a generation.
Some later adopters, Iceland and Ireland, have suffered
financial crises76 and treat almost all of their carbon tax
proceeds as badly-needed general government revenues.77 
In most of the rest of the world, revenue recycling is
focused on improving the political economy of carbon
taxation. As the effects of carbon taxation are unevenly felt,
revenue recycling can be targeted towards disaffected
groups or populations. For example, a frequent source of 
opposition to carbon taxes stems from the widely-held
perception that they are regressive—that they impose a
disproportionate impact on poorer individuals and 
households.78 Whether carbon taxation is actually
72. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu et al., Pollution Tax Heuristics: An Empirical
Study of Willingness to Pay Higher Gasoline Taxes, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3612, 3616
(2008).
73. Id.
74. Carl & Fedor, supra note 61.
75. WORLD BANK, supra note 38 and text accompanying.
76. See, e.g., Iceland to End Capital Controls from 2008 Financial Crisis,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-39248677; 
Ireland’s Banking Crisis: a Timeline, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8419616/Irelands-banking-
crisis-timeline.html.
77. Carl & Fedor, supra note 61, at 53.
78. See discussion infra notes 99-102 and notes 150-Error! Bookmark not
defined. and accompanying text.
   
        
       
    
      
    
     
   
    
      
      
     
  
      
       
     
       
      
     
          
     
        
     
     
       
      
      
       
 
      
         
           
     
     
            
    
8732017] CARBON TAXATION
regressive or not is an open question,79 but given the 
widespread perception that it is, proposals have been made 
to recycle revenues to compensate poorer households for
higher energy prices. Carbon taxation can also increase 
production costs; revenue recycling could finance the 
reduction of corporate income taxes to help domestic
industries compete internationally. Six carbon-taxing 
jurisdictions reduce some corporation-based taxes (this
includes payroll taxes, which may inure to the benefit of 
individuals), and four reduce personal income taxes.80 Most
recent adopters of carbon taxation have chosen one of these 
two forms of revenue recycling.
British Columbia’s carbon tax was meant to be 
“revenue neutral,” and so was packaged with reductions in
the marginal income tax rates of the lowest two tax
brackets, as well as reductions in the corporate income tax
rate.81 The tax also included provisions for additional
“adjustment measures”82 to ensure that the province took in
less money in carbon tax revenues than it spent under the 
law. The provincial government was so committed to 
preventing a net increase in government revenues that it
enacted a bizarre provision requiring the provincial Finance 
Minister to personally guarantee that carbon tax outflows
exceeded revenues, imposing a salary penalty as
punishment if that did not occur.83 Unsurprisingly, the 
British Columbia carbon tax has turned out to be 
consistently revenue-negative, taking in much less in
79. See discussion infra notes 99-102.
80. See Gale et al., supra note 66.
81. Kathryn Harrison, The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon
Tax 9–10 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Working
Paper No. 63, 2013), http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3z04gkkhkg-en.
82. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c 40, § 2 (Can.).
83. Id. §§ 3–5.
      
       
    
       
     
    
         
   
      
     
     
        
       
       
      
         
        
     
      
       
       
    
 
          
 
       
            
        
   
    
 
          
      
    
 
       
874 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
revenues than it has cost the province.84 
British Columbia’s brute force implementation of a
revenue-neutrality mandate is clumsy, but it highlights a
thorny problem with revenue recycling: if the goal of 
revenue recycling is to achieve a balance between inflows 
and outflows in a carbon tax law, the inherent uncertainties
of revenue collection make it difficult to guarantee 
neutrality. How much emissions would decline due to a
carbon tax is uncertain, making the revenue side 
uncertain.85 Income and sales tax revenues are also 
notoriously volatile.86 It becomes a tricky matter to forecast
whether a carbon tax with revenue recycling would increase 
or decrease government receipts, and by how much.
II. OPTIONS FOR CARBON TAX REVENUES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Focusing on revenue uses is so important because 
hostility towards any policy bearing the label “tax” is based
on the instant comprehension that it will cost.87 Economic
anxieties in the general populace persist beyond the 2008– 
09 financial crisis and exacerbate the visceral nature of this
realization, making it cognitively challenging for most
people to think any further. Lost, then, is any appreciation 
of the other side of taxation and the productive uses to 
84. See B.C. MINISTRY OF FIN., BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2015/16—2017/18,
60 (2015), http://bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2015/bfp/2015_Budget_and_Fiscal_Plan.pdf. 
(Table 1, showing revenue measures [outflows] exceeding revenues.).
85. For a review of the uncertainties of carbon elasticity—the amount of
carbon dioxide emissions reductions resulting from carbon pricing, see NOAH
KAUFMAN ET AL., PUTTING A PRICE ON CARBON: REDUCING EMISSIONS, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST. 8 (2016), http://www.wri.org/publication/putting-price-carbon-
reducing-emissions.
86. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THE STATE TAX VOLATILITY PROBLEM: ELIMINATING THE
STATE INCOME TAX NOT A SOLUTION 1 (2013), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/4-18-13sfp.pdf.
87. See Lucas, supra note 23, at 21.
   
       
     
       
   
         
        
        
     
      
      
         
        
   
    
       
    
      
        
      
        
       
       
        
     
    
 
              
         
 
            
       
              
    
8752017] CARBON TAXATION
which revenues may be deployed. This may be of particular
relevance should a state government decide to enact a
carbon tax, as state governments often have less flexibility
with new revenue sources.88 
A central theme of this Article is that decisions on the 
uses of carbon tax revenues are not purely economic in
nature. If they were, then there is no reason to stray from
the standard public finance position of simply absorbing
carbon tax revenues into the general treasury and
appropriating them where most needed.89 Rather, enacting
a carbon tax, along with its revenue implications, is a
discrete action with specific political and legal choices. This
Article seeks to examine these implications.
Of the possible uses of carbon tax revenues nine 
discussed in this Part have been the most commonly
discussed in the United States.
A. Option One: Reduce Personal Income Taxes 
Carbon tax revenues can be used to reduce marginal
personal income tax rates. Both carbon tax and personal
income tax revenues can only be estimated, so there is some 
uncertainty in determining how much of a reduction in
personal income tax rates would correspond to a given
carbon tax rate. Personal income tax revenues, in
particular, depend on a variety of factors, such as
compliance rates90 (which themselves are a function of the 
resources afforded the Internal Revenue Service to monitor
88. See Russell S. Sobel & Gary A. Wagner, Cyclical Variability in State
Government Revenue: Can Tax Reform Reduce It?, ST. TAX NOTES 569, 569
(2003).
89. See Craig Brett & Michael Keen, Political Uncertainty and the
Earmarking of Environmental Taxes, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 315, 316 (2000).
90. See Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal
Individual Income Tax, 1977–1986, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 396 (1990).
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compliance),91 economic conditions, income distributions,
and international tax dynamics.92 
B. Option Two: Reduce Corporate Income Taxes 
U.S.-based corporations face the highest statutory
income tax rates of all thirty-four countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).93 While U.S. corporations also enjoy an intractably
large and bewildering array of tax benefits,94 effective 
corporate income tax rates are still high in comparison with
other OECD countries.95 In recent years, a number of U.S.-
incorporated firms have actually changed their taxpaying
status by merging with a foreign corporation, and re-
incorporating in another country, thereby avoiding high
U.S. rates.96 Corporate income taxes are also believed to 
displace investment, thereby dampening economic activity
and growth.97 Most economic models seem to suggest that
reducing corporate income taxes would be one of the more 
economically efficient uses of carbon tax revenues, reducing
91. Id. at 406.
92. See CHARLES L. BALLARD ET AL., A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR TAX 
POLICY EVALUATION 1–5 (1985) (describing detailed model of tax revenues,
based on a variety of economic factors).
93. OECD Tax Database, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial
(Table II.1., Corporate Income Tax Rates [2016]) (last visited June 11, 2017).
94. See Michael P. Devereux et al., Corporate Income Tax Reforms and
International Tax Competition, 17 ECON. POL’Y 449, 492 (2002).
95. See KEVIN A. HASSETT & APARNA MATHUR, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR 
PUB. POL’Y RES., REPORT CARD ON EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX RATES: UNITED 
STATES GETS AN F 3–5 (2011), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
10/TPO-2011-01-g.pdf.
96. See, e.g., David Jolly, Ireland, Home to U.S. ‘Inversions,’ Sees Huge
Growth in G.D.P., N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/13/b/dealbook/ireland-us-tax-inversion.html.
97. See Steven Fazzari et al., Investment, Financing Decisions, and Tax
Policy, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 204 (1988).
   
         
 
        
       
     
        
      
     
    
        
       
       
      
         
    
     
        
       
 
        
    
 
 
            
      
              
    
            
 
8772017] CARBON TAXATION
as it does what is considered to be a highly distortionary
tax.98 
C. Option Three: Reduce Capital Gains Taxes 
As opposed to reducing taxes on labor, revenues could
be used to reduce taxes on investments. Capital gains taxes
reduce investment activity by reducing profitability. Both
individuals and corporations pay capital gains taxes, but
capital investment is largely the domain of the wealthy,99 
making this option politically challenging.
D. Option Four: Reduce Consumption Taxes, Such As Sales 
Taxes 
Instead of tax reductions benefiting wealthy individuals 
and corporations, carbon tax proceeds might be better used
to benefit poorer households. One way of doing this is to 
reduce consumption taxes, such as sales taxes, which are 
generally considered regressive.100 The United States does
not have a federal sales tax, so this option would only be 
available at state and local levels.
E. Option Five: Reduce Payroll Taxes 
So-called payroll taxes—those levied in the context of 
an employment relationship, such as social security and
workers compensation,101 are taxes on labor income, but are 
98. See JARED CARBONE ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DEFICIT
REDUCTION AND CARBON TAXES: BUDGETARY, ECONOMIC, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
IMPACTS 8 (2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/
RFF-Rpt-Carbone.etal.CarbonTaxes.pdf.
99. David Domeij & Jonathan Heathcote, On the Distributional Effects of
Reducing Capital Taxes, 45 INT’L. ECON. REV. 523, 538–39 (2004).
100. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Don’t Buy the Sales Tax, BROOKINGS INST.
(Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dont-buy-the-sales-tax/.
101. See Daniel B. Suits, Measurement of Tax Progressivity, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 747, 749 (1977).
      
       
      
      
           
     
      
       
       
        
       
      
        
           
    
   
    
        
        
      
 
   
            
     
             
       
          
      
 
   
          
878 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
collected by employers. Most payroll taxes are regressive,102 
with poorer taxpayers bearing a disproportionately large 
share of the burden in funding these schemes.103 A carbon
tax paired with reduction in payroll taxes could result in a
progressive tax shift that also offers the benefit of 
encouraging employment by effectively raising wages.
F. Option Six: Rebate All the Proceeds In a Lump Sum To 
All Households 
A more direct way of helping poorer households is to 
return the proceeds directly back to taxpayers in the form of 
a lump sum. In schemes that return carbon tax proceeds to 
head-of-household taxpayers on a roughly per person
scheme, the effect is to actually overcompensate poorer
households for higher energy costs, as they will generally
get back more in their lump sum than they pay out in
higher costs.104 The highest income (and highest-
consuming) households would be worse off.105 
G. Option Seven: Reduce the Impacts on Fossil Fuel Sectors 
by Funding Support and Retraining Programs 
A source of vigorous political opposition to climate 
policy comes from industrial sectors and geographic regions
that are highly dependent upon fossil fuels.106 A common
suggestion has thus been to include in climate policy a 
102. Id.
103. But see Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence¸ in 4 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1787, 1792 n.3 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin 
Feldstein, eds., 2002) (noting that the payroll taxes are not regressive if the
funds are used to provide progressive benefits).
104. ROBERTON C. WILLIAMS III ET AL., THE INITIAL INCIDENCE OF A CARBON 
TAX ACROSS INCOME GROUPS 12 Tbl. 2 (2014), http://www.rff.org/files/
sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-24.pdf.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Barbara Freese, Coal: A Human History 247–61 (2003).
   
     
        
     
   
       
        
     
      
      
       
     
      
      
      
        
        
     
         
       
      
         
       
 
      
     
 
             
  
    
8792017] CARBON TAXATION
component that would alleviate the economic dislocation
caused by a large shift in energy resources.107 
G. Option Eight: Fund Clean Energy Initiatives 
In addition to taxing a “bad”—greenhouse gas
emissions—it might be desirable to subsidize a “good”—low-
carbon or non-carbon technologies. Carbon taxes impose a
marginal cost on greenhouse gas emissions, but it might be 
possible to also make non-marginal costs, such as capital
investment, lower for desirable technologies. For example,
as part of an economic stimulus package to address the 
2008–09 global financial crisis, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act108 put into place subsidies for renewable 
energy sources, which have contributed to an upsurge in
wind and solar energy deployment.109 
H. Option Nine: Keep the Revenue for General Treasury 
Purposes, Including Paying Down Debt 
All of these first eight options essentially pre-commit
carbon tax revenues to some stated purpose. As a logical
matter, nothing is ever gained by limiting the options
available; having more flexibility should always be welfare-
increasing. In that vein, the best logical option is to not
commit to recycling revenues, but to simply absorb them
into the general treasury, for the legislature to use it as it
deems fit. At the federal level, it is entirely possible that the 
best use of carbon tax proceeds would be to pay down
107. See ADELE C. MORRIS, BROOKINGS INST., BUILD A BETTER FUTURE FOR 
COAL WORKERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 17 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/04/build-a-better-future-for-coal-workers-and-their-
communities-morris-updated-071216.pdf
108. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (2009).
109. Id. § 1603(a)-(d).
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sovereign debt.110 
But this little bit of logic behind the last option would
just look objectionably like a simple tax increase to a vast
majority of voters, left or right. To fall back on economic
dogma is to abdicate the political discussion. The chasm
between what makes sense from a theoretical public policy
point of view and what makes political sense only
underscores the need for climate policy, and carbon taxation
in particular, to grapple with political realities. This Article 
is an attempt to link economic and political discussions.
III. DISTRIBUTIONAL AND MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
REVENUE OPTIONS 
How then, to choose from among this bewildering array
of options? Taking it as a given that allocation of carbon tax
revenues is a deeply political decision, some quantitative 
understanding of the impacts of revenue options is essential
to making informed political decisions. Analysis of the 
macroeconomic and distributional implications of different
revenue options is essential to informed carbon tax
revenue-allocation, as it should be for any fiscal policy.
Organizing these options clarifies the political
objectives that might be satisfied by each option. Revenue 
recycling Options One, Two, and Three might be roughly
characterized as options that benefit the wealthy. All of 
those taxes are based on income of some sort, and since 
wealthy populations contribute such a large fraction of 
income tax proceeds—the top one percent of U.S. income 
earners paid 37.8 percent of all federal income taxes in
2013111—reducing those taxes would, by and large, benefit
110. See Gale et al., supra note 66.
111. Scott Greenberg, Summary of the Latest Federal Income Tax Data, 2015
Update, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/summary-latest-
federal-income-tax-data-2015-update#_ftn1 (Table 6, Total Income Tax Shares,
1980–2013).
   
     
   
      
       
  
       
       
    
        
        
       
     
     
    
        
 
     
     
         
     
    
     
      
      
    
      
      
     
      
     
 
      
              
   
       
        
8812017] CARBON TAXATION
those paying more of the income taxes. It is certainly
possible to impose progressiveness into a personal income 
tax reduction, as British Columbia’s carbon tax did, 
reducing personal income tax rates for only the two lowest
of five income tax brackets.112 
Revenue recycling Options Four, Five, and Six might be 
roughly characterized as options that benefit low- and 
moderate-income households. All of these options return
carbon tax proceeds to individuals and households, and all
do it to virtually all individuals and households, but in a
way that redounds to greater benefit to low and moderate 
income households. Poorer households have a higher
marginal utility of money,113 so the modest relief afforded
by these forms of revenue recycling are more economically
important to poorer households than rich ones, even if they
receive the same amounts.114 
The last trio of revenue recycling Options Seven, Eight,
and Nine, grapple with the fundamental question of how
government should spend money. A carbon tax could be just
one of several sources of government revenue, and the 
standard public finance doctrine is to give legislators
discretion to make fiscal decisions unfettered by
earmarks.115 However, it seems politically unpalatable at
the moment to impose a carbon tax without any
compensating benefit attached to it.
In any case, without some quantitative analysis, any
political discussion of carbon tax revenues remains
unmoored from reality. Some effort to quantitatively
express net changes to discrete groups of people is needed
to understand the distributional implications. As well, some 
112. Harrison, supra note 81, at 10.
113. See Edward J. McCaffrey, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 76 (1994).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
115. Brett & Keen, supra note 89.
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attempt to forecast the macroeconomic impacts of carbon
taxation and concomitant revenue use is absolutely
necessary to identify the likely tradeoffs in making revenue 
decisions, as it always is for fiscal policy.
A. A Macroeconomic Hierarchy of Options 
The macroeconomic and distributional impacts of 
carbon taxes and of different revenue recycling schemes
have been estimated using economic models. Most
commonly, “computable general equilibrium” (CGE) models
use broad economic data to project how an economic change 
will impact general economic conditions.116 As opposed to 
some older, less comprehensive models, a CGE model
employs data from a broad range of industries, households,
and sectors, to estimate a set of dynamic relationships
among them.117 For example, a CGE model would include 
one or more own-price electricity elasticities, so that if
electricity prices increased by a certain amount, the CGE
model would have a component that would, as a first-order
estimate, predict how much less electricity was consumed
by households.118 On top of that estimate, however, are the 
many other relationships impacted by electricity prices and
their potential to impact household decisions—like the 
potential for higher electricity prices to increase prices for
other goods and services, which could in turn affect home 
electricity consumption.119 But much larger are a wide 
variety of relationships among a broad range of economic
agents. CGE models attempt to capture those 
interdependencies, so that one price change in one 
116. Peter B. Dixon & B.R. Parmenter, Computable General Equilibrium
Modelling for Policy Analysis and Forecasting, in HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL
ECONOMICS 3-79 (Hans M. Amman et al. eds., 1996).
117. Id. at 5–6.
118. See, e.g., CARBONE ET AL., supra note 98, at 3.
119. See WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 104, at 2–3.
   
     
     
          
        
      
    
       
     
      
    
       
      
         
      
        
      
     
     
    
      
      
       
        
         
        
     
 
          
        
  
      
           
   
              
  
             
           
 
8832017] CARBON TAXATION
market—like one created by a carbon tax—can be 
accurately modeled and most of the economic ripples
captured. Especially for a policy like a carbon tax, in which
energy prices would affect almost every other market,120 a 
CGE model is the best, if the most data-intensive tool to 
estimate broader economic effects. Perhaps more 
importantly for our purposes, a CGE model can capture the 
impacts of different households,121 so it can differentiate the 
impacts of a carbon tax across the income spectrum,
answering important distributional questions.
One CGE model developed by researchers at Resources
for the Future (RFF), a respected environmental economic
think tank, is what is known as an “overlapping
generations” model, which estimates the impacts upon
different populations by age cohort.122 This model offers a
finer-grained analysis of the distributional impacts, as well
as the effects of a carbon-tax-and-revenue-recycling policy
over time, differentiating among generations.
The RFF model considered four categories of revenue 
recycling options: reducing “capital taxes,” either corporate 
income taxes or capital gains taxes (Options Two and
Three), reducing “labor taxes” or personal income taxes
(Option One), reducing consumption taxes (Option Four), or
rebating carbon tax revenues in a lump sum transfer
(Option Six).123 The lump sum would be paid to adults, not
children.124 RFF’s results, graphed below, compare the 
120. ROBERTON C. WILLIAMS III ET AL., THE INITIAL INCIDENCE OF A CARBON 
TAX ACROSS U.S. STATES 5 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 14-
25, 2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-
14-25.pdf (specifying a model with 19 industries, 15 of them carbon-intensive).
121. WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 104, at 196.
122. Id.
123. CARBONE ET AL, supra note 98, at 4; WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 104,
at 4–5 (excluding consumption tax reductions).
124. CARBONE ET AL., supra note 98, at 13. A slightly different RFF model
assumed the lump sum would be paid to all individuals, adults and children
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macroeconomic effects of four carbon tax revenue options
over time. The lines compare GDP in four scenarios. The 
top line shows that in the beginning, a carbon tax paired
with a reduction in taxes on capital investment would
initially depress GDP slightly, but quickly yield greater 
GDP than the world without any carbon taxes and any tax 
reductions. The second line from the top shows that a
carbon tax paired with a reduction in payroll taxes never
produces more economic growth than the world without the 
tax shift, though that option certainly has more progressive 
distributional effects than cuts to corporate income taxes
would. Finally, using a carbon tax to reduce consumption
taxes and to produce a lump sum transfer (rebate) fares the 
worst as macroeconomic policy, but these options offer
significant progressive distributional advantages.
alike. WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 104, at 4.
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FIGURE 1. Percentage Difference in GDP: $30/ton Revenue 
Neutral Carbon Dioxide Tax Relative to Base Case125 
2.00% 
1.00% 






2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
CO2 tax in lieu of labor
tax 
CO2 tax in lieu of
consumption tax 
CO2 tax with lump sum
transfer 
-4.00% 
It is important, however, to note three things about
Figure 1. First, the RFF model assumes the social cost of 
carbon is zero.126 In other words, these GDP projections do 
not take into account that reducing greenhouse gas
emissions will produce any benefits in the form of higher
GDP. This is not, of course, to cede to climate skeptics, or to 
imitate their fallacious analysis, that the costs of climate 
change are low or zero. Damages from climate change are 
uncertain, but they are certainly not zero. Curbing
greenhouse gas emissions is so important that a carbon tax
would easily pass a cost-benefit test,127 especially if the 
125. CARBONE ET AL., supra note 98, at 8.
126. Id. at 3 (“The analysis does not consider the benefits of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.”).
127. See, e.g., JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION 
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near-term health and environmental co-benefits of reduced
fossil fuel combustion are included,128 and even more so if 
the possibility of catastrophic damages are included.129 
Rather the RFF study identifies some no-cost or very-low-
cost ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.130 Its results
suggest that even if one insists that climate change is a
“hoax,” a well-designed carbon tax shifting tax burden from
productive activities to carbon emissions could be 
economically beneficial, or at the very least, minimally
disruptive. Of course, because of this conscious omission,
the RFF results should not be considered any kind of cost-
benefit analysis, as the benefit side would necessarily
include both the economic benefits of revenues and the 
many environmental and social benefits of reducing
emissions.
Second, the figure compares GDP levels, not GDP 
growth rates. U.S. GDP in 2013 was $16.77 trillion; one 
percent of that is $167 billion. According to this RFF model,
if one were to levy a carbon tax and reduce personal income 
taxes by the exact amount of the carbon tax revenues, GDP 
would be only about half a percent lower, every year, over
the long term. Again, this consciously assumes (without
IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2014) (average median value of just over $300 billion).
Even the fairly conservative social cost of carbon of $69 per ton, in 2050 dollars,
assuming a three percent discount rate, multiplied by 5.5 gigatons of carbon
dioxide emissions each year, yields a benefit of $380 billion. See sources cited
supra notes 26, 27. See also Tamma A. Carleton & Solomon M. Hsiang, Social 
and Economic Impacts of Climate, 353 SCIENCE 1112, 1123 (2016) (estimating 
future impacts of climate change at $9.7 trillion, discounted to present value).
128. The non-climate costs of fossil fuel combustion are most pronounced with
coal, which imposes a large variety of environmental and health costs, from the
destructive mining methods to the emission of fine particulate matter leading to
cardiopulmonary disease and premature death. See e.g., Paul R. Epstein, et al.,
Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 
85 (2011).
129. See Martin Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVT’L ECON. & POL’Y 275, 275 (2011).
130. See CARBONE ET AL., supra note 98, at 10 (“[t]he most important 
interpretation of this figure is that the effects are relatively small.”).
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asserting) that there is zero value in reducing of greenhouse 
gas emissions themselves.
Third, as comprehensive and cutting-edge as the RFF 
model is, it fails to fully account for a potentially important
economic anomaly. CGE models simulate two effects:
consumer spending, which stimulates the economy by
demanding things, and producer investment, which
stimulates the economy by investing to produce things.131 
So a populist impulse to place money in the hands of 
individuals ordinarily carries an opportunity cost: it
displaces money in the hands of producers—commonly
corporations—which would spend the money on capital
investments, creating jobs and therefore more demand. But
here is the economic anomaly: it has been commonly
observed that subsequent to the 2008–09 global financial
crisis, many firms have been hoarding cash, eschewing
capital investments, and therefore not stimulating economic
activity anyway.132 If, taking into account historical
investment trends, that is true, and if there is a systemic
economic reason for a lack of corporate spending, then there 
is no reason to be placing money in the hands of 
corporations, since they are not spending it anyway. The 
only place to stimulate economic activity would be on the 
consumer side. And if that is true, then a carbon tax paired
with either the lump sum rebate or the consumption tax
relief might actually perform better economically than the 
alternatives. This is not a settled economic question, so 
whether one believes that money is better placed in the 
hands of consumers or producers is likely to depend more 
on ideology than empirical support.
With all that in mind, the model still produces, for
131. Dixon & Parmenter, supra note 116, at 5 (“They describe how demand 
and supply decisions made by different economic actors determine the prices of
at least some commodities and factors.”).
132. See, e.g., Adam Davidson, Why Are Corporations Hoarding Trillions?
N.Y. TIMES, January 24, 2016, at MM22.
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economists, an unsurprising hierarchy of options. From a
strictly macroeconomic standpoint, and using conventional 
assumptions, the use of carbon revenues that best
stimulates economic growth is to reduce capital taxes. The 
intuition behind this tentative result is that corporate 
income taxes and capital gains taxes are distortionary,
causing a misallocation of resources, particularly in the 
United States where rates are high.133 In fact, even without
considering any social cost of carbon, the simple transfer of 
tax from corporate taxpayers to carbon emitters will
generate a small increase in GDP over the long run, on the 
order of one percent. Taking as a given the contestable but
reasonable assumptions embodied in the RFF model, that is
a free lunch. A carbon tax paired with an equivalent
corporate income tax relief is likely to reduce emissions and 
increase economic output. GDP should not be the only, or
even the most important criterion; many mainstream
economists are dismayed at the continuing dominance of 
GDP as an indicator.134 But it is a rough measure of 
economic activity and therefore of economic health, if one 
that should be taken with a grain of salt.
No one paying attention to American politics could
possibly accept the preceding paragraph without
misgivings. A reduction in corporate income taxation would
redound overwhelmingly to the benefit of the richest
133. See sources cited supra notes 93-95.
134. EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT
SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 19 (2014) (“To summarize, GDP and similar metrics
are poor surrogate measures of welfare.”). See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experiences Utility, 112 Q. J. OF ECON. 375, 
375 (1997); Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic Performance, 107
ECON. J. 1815, 1815 (1977) (“Economic performance is not intrinsically 
interesting. No-one is concerned in a genuine sense about the level of gross
national product last year or about next year’s exchange rate . . . . The relevance
of economic performance is . . . not the consumption of beefburgers, nor the
accumulation of television sets, nor the vanquishing of some high level of
interest rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind’s feeling of well-being.
Economic things matter only in so far as they make people happier.”).
   
   
       
        
        
       
      
    
    
        
       
       
       
   
       
     
     
         
      
   
  
       
         
     
    
 
             
    
         
 
           
   
   
         
      
  
   
            
        
 
8892017] CARBON TAXATION
individuals—those that have the requisite wealth to invest
in equities and profit from lowered corporate income tax
rates.135 In a period of widening American wealth and
income inequality,136 it is surely a dicey political proposition
to use a carbon tax to widen wealth and income gaps.
In fact, the apparent misfortune is the result that the 
option that best addresses inequality—the lump sum 
distribution—appears to be the least friendly to economic
growth. Collecting a carbon tax and rebating the proceeds
in a lump sum distribution admirably protects low-income 
households. But if one warily accepts GDP as a rough
measure of efficiency, then it appears that efficiency and
progressiveness are at odds.
It is worth noting that an alternative model,
commissioned by the advocacy group Citizens’ Climate 
Lobby (CCL), found dramatically more positive economic
outcomes for a lump sum distribution.137 That study found
that GDP would grow over time.138 While the models have 
many similarities, the dramatic difference in 
macroeconomic projections are attributable to two 
differences. First, the RFF model assumed that capital was
free to flow across borders, so that a carbon tax would send
some capital offshore, to produce in other, carbon tax-free 
countries.139 The CCL model assumes quite the opposite:
135. See, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income
Tax, 70 J. POLIT. ECON. 215, 215 (1962).
136. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 375 
(2014).
137. Our Solution: Carbon Fee and Dividend Policy, CITIZENS’ CLIMATE
LOBBY, https://citizensclimatelobby.org/carbon-fee-and-dividend/ (last visited
June 24, 2017).
138. SCOTT NYSTROM & PATRICK LUCKOW, THE ECONOMIC CLIMATE, FISCAL,
POWER, AND DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF A NATIONAL FEE-AND-DIVIDEND CARBON 
TAX 21 (2013), http://citizensclimatelobby.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/
REMI-carbon-tax-report-62141.pdf (Figure 3.5).
139. WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 104, at 7 (“We assume international
prices are fixed (i.e., a small open economy assumption) and that domestic and 
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the legality and enforcement of a border tax adjustment,
which would allow the United States to impose a tariff on
goods imported from countries without a carbon tax.140 
Such a provision would prevent capital from flowing out of 
the U.S. in search of carbon tax-free jurisdictions. The 
consistency of such a provision with international trade law
is uncertain, with many implementing details
determinative of whether the World Trade Organization
(WTO) would allow it.141 
The second difference accounting for the less rosy
economic projections by the RFF model is that the CCL-
commissioned model included the co-benefits of reduced air
pollution.142 Reducing carbon dioxide emissions by reducing
coal combustion produces health benefits having nothing to 
do with climate change.143 In addition to carbon dioxide 
emissions, coal combustion produces sulfur dioxide and fine 
particulate matter pollution, which causes cardiopulmonary
diseases that cause roughly 7,500 premature deaths per
year.144 Adding in those health benefits, and the 
contribution of an additional 7,500 people per year
surviving and contributing to economic growth is bound to 
improve the economic outlook.145 
A macroeconomic analysis takes on more complexity if a
international varieties of each good are imperfect substitutes for each other.”).
140. NYSTROM & LUCKOW, supra note 138, at 17–18.
141. See Nigel Bankes et al., International Trade and Investment Law and
Carbon Management Technologies, 53 NAT. RES. J. 285, 322, 322–23 (2013). But
see Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments
Under WTO Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE 
WTO 48–49 (Provost C., & G. Van Calster, ets, 2012).
142. NYSTROM & LUCKOW, supra note 138, at 43.
143. Epstein, supra note 128.
144. JONATHAN BANKS & DAVID MARSHALL, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,
REGULATION WORKS: HOW SCIENCE, ADVOCACY AND GOOD REGULATIONS
COMBINED TO REDUCE POWER PLANT POLLUTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACTS 4 
(2015), http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/RGGI-Report.pdf.
145. Id.
   
         
         
      
     
      
       
     
     
    
     
        
       
  
     
         
       
      
      
       
        
    
      
 
           
        
       
         
             
         
 
               
               
          




state-level carbon tax is under consideration. A border tax
adjustment at a state level, to prevent capital from fleeing a 
carbon-taxing state, would need to be carefully designed to 
avoid running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.146 
Certain industries may be much more important in some 
states, creating larger employment effects than would be 
the case on the national level. Some states do not have 
personal or corporate income taxes.147 Also, the RFF and
CCL-commissioned studies have parameters for household-
level behavior, but these are much more reliable at the 
federal level than at the state level. Thus, these analyses
should be viewed with caution when applied to a state 
carbon tax.
B. Some Distributional Considerations 
The shortcomings of GDP as an economic indicator are 
really secondary to a much larger failing, at least from a 
political economy perspective; it says nothing about
distribution. So while a boost to GDP must certainly be a
good thing, the proper place of GDP is alongside a number
of other criteria for what constitutes good policy. Large 
policy changes inevitably create winners and losers, and it
is important to be mindful of the political truism—that 
losers scream louder than winners applaud.148 Making 
146. See, e.g., Darien Shanske, State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Can Formulary Apportionment Save the World?, 18 CHAPMAN 
L. REV. 191, 205–09 (2014); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, A State-Level
Carbon Tax With Border Adjustments, 83 STATE TAX NOTES 911, 917 (2017).
147. Seven states do not have an income tax. Thomas C. Frohlich, States With
No Individual Income Tax, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2016/03/19/states-no-
individual-income-tax/81965082/.
148. The origin of this saying is unclear, but the most credible attribution of a
variation of this is to Joel Slemrod, a professor at the Stephen M. Ross School of
Business at the University of Michigan. See Joel Slemrod ‘73 on Reforming the
Tax Code, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. (Princeton Univ., Princeton, N.J.), Apr. 3, 
2013, https://paw.princeton.edu/article/joel-slemrod-%E2%80%9973-reforming-
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serious attempts to compensate losers, or to minimize their
losses, is practicing good politics.
This is especially true of a fairly large policy change,
such as a carbon tax. Collecting $150 billion in revenues
from Americans would already be disruptive; the wrenching
economic effects on some industries is even more cause for
concern. A carbon tax must address the distributional
consequences of its revenue uses, and this section turns to 
several potential distributional considerations.
As noted above, a naked carbon tax, without any
revenue recycling, is widely believed to be regressive. The 
costs of fossil-generated energy is generally a larger fraction
of a poorer household’s budget, even if it is in absolute 
terms, smaller than that of a rich household’s budget.149 
Revenue recycling Options Four, Five, and Six all seek to 
target a significant portion of the revenues towards poor,
disproportionately affected households.
Consumption taxes, even if they exempt basic needs
such as food and clothing, still tend to be more economically
painful to lower-income households than rich ones.150 While 
everybody pays the same sales tax rate, and while rich
households pay more in absolute terms (because they buy
more), sales taxes represent a larger and more precious
fraction of a poorer household’s budget, which has less
flexibility. Curtailing sales taxes would thus have an anti-
regressive effect.
By the same logic, payroll taxes, which are generally
tax-code.
149. See HSU, supra note 20, at 124–38.
150. The matter of tax incidence is complicated and context-specific, but as a
general matter, consumption taxes, such as sales taxes and excise taxes, are
considered regressive. See, e.g., Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 103 at 1819.
But see James M. Poterba, Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of
Excise Taxes, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 325, 325 (1989).
   
        
   
     
        
       
        
      
      
       
        
   
       
            
    
         
        
  
    
    
       
        
         
      
         
    
   
     
 
    
          
       
           
   
   
   
8932017] CARBON TAXATION
taxed at a flat rate up to an annually-determined maximum
amount,151 are regressive because even though lower-
income households pay less, those amounts paid impose 
greater and more painful constraints on their budgets than
those of richer ones.152 Reducing payroll taxes would thus
generally work a greater benefit for poorer households.
Finally, a lump-sum distribution also works on this 
same smaller-but-more-painful principle, only in reverse: a
lump sum of money distributed to all households would be 
equal across all households in absolute terms, but would be 
more economically valuable to the poorer household.153 
Consider the needs of a poor household, and imagine what
it could do with a check for $500: far more than it would in
the hands of a wealthy household.
Economic models suggest that a carbon tax paired with
a lump sum distribution will make most households better
off, including lower-income ones.154 The RFF model
discussed above suggests that the median-income-quintile
household—those twenty percent of households that have 
forty percent above them and forty percent below them— 
would be slightly better off with a carbon tax paired with a 
lump sum distribution.155 A $30 per-ton carbon tax would
produce a lump sum rebate of $1,600, easily more than
offsetting a higher energy bill of $531, and even offsetting
an average loss of personal income—due to lost jobs—of 
$834.156 The median-income-quintile household would
experience a net gain of $279.157 
151. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2015).
152. Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 103, at 1789.
153. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.




      
         
       
        
    
     
    
     
     
       
      
       
      
 
    
      
      
          
      
 
      
    
        
     
    
     
     
        
     
     
     
      
       
 
   
   
894 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
To those that might complain that a carbon tax with a
lump sum distribution is “redistribution”: it certainly is. In
the RFF model, the $30 carbon tax with a lump sum
distribution would cost the highest-income quintile—the top
twenty percent—more than $6,000, or 1.93% of that
quintile’s average household income of about $310,000.158 
At the other end of the income spectrum, the lowest
quintile—the bottom twenty percent—would realize a net
benefit of about $1,200, a good 3.36% of that quintile’s
average household income of $35,000.159 When all is said
and done, even by the fairly crabbed assumptions of the 
RFF model, the extent of wealth redistribution is fairly
modest.
But even at the end of this line of careful analysis, a 
wrinkle awaits. The widespread perception that a carbon
tax is regressive may not be completely accurate. As it 
turns out, it is not necessarily the case that a carbon tax
imposes disproportionate costs on poorer households than
rich.
The CGE models that attempt to model distributional
impacts use household income as a measure of the ability to 
absorb the higher energy costs of a carbon tax. But year-to-
year income may not accurately capture the true economic
well-being of some individuals, some of whom may
currently have low incomes but high future income 
potential, such as those seeking post-secondary graduate 
education in business, medicine, or law. At the opposite end
of the age spectrum, retirees may have very little income,
but may be drawing down on a large retirement portfolio of 
investments; nor could those individuals be considered
"poor." Wealth, or "lifetime income," would be better
indicators of the ability to absorb higher costs from carbon
158. Id.
159. Id.
   
      
 
    
    
     
      
       
       
        
      
      
        
       
      
         
         
    
        
        
     
       
       
     
       
 
        
       
           
      
               
       
            
     
             
       
        
            
 
8952017] CARBON TAXATION
taxation, but are more difficult to measure.160 So, what to 
do?
Milton Friedman's "permanent income hypothesis"
suggests that individuals and households smooth
consumption over the expected course of their lives,
sometimes spending more and sometimes spending less
than their income might suggest.161 Given that, economists
have wondered if consumption is actually a better indicator
of economic well-being than income, and that taxes on
consumption (such as sales taxes) are actually less
regressive than previously thought.162 As a logical
extension, economists have wondered if a carbon tax is as
regressive as some fear.163 If wealth, or lifetime income, is a
better measure of the ability to absorb the higher costs of a
carbon tax, and consumption is a better indicator of wealth,
then a carbon tax may actually do a bit of the redistribution
all by itself.164 
An additional reason that carbon taxation may not be 
as regressive as initially feared is that some individuals and
households with low incomes receive government benefits, 
some of which are indexed for inflation. A carbon tax that
increases energy costs would also trigger increases in these 
benefits, insulating their recipients from some of the 
economic harm.165 However, it is important to note that
160. See, e.g., FRANK A. COWELL, MEASURING INEQUALITY 4–7 (2009)
(comparing income with "lifetime income," or wealth).
161. Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function 221 (1957).
162. Poterba, supra note 150.
163. Kevin A. Hassett et al., The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime
and Regional Analysis, 30 ENERGY J. 155, 166–67 (2009) ("Our results suggest
that wehen the total lifetime effect of a carbon tax is taken into account, the 
regressivity of the tax decreases.").
164. Don Fullerton et al., Does the Indexing of Government Transfers Make
Carbon Pricing Progressive?, 94 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 347, 352 (2011).
165. A recent paper makes the bold assertion that carbon taxation, even 
without considering the revenue side, is a progressive tax. Julie-Anne Cronin et
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even in low-income groups, recipients of government
benefits constitute a relatively a small fraction,166 so that
inflation indexing itself is far from a salve for
regressiveness.
No one would assert that income is uncorrelated with
wealth, so clearly the CGE models are telling us something
about the regressiveness of a carbon tax. What these areas
of uncertainty highlight is not so much the indeterminacy of 
economic analyses, but the need to deploy them in a
nuanced way, collecting up the economic insights without
elevating them to the level of gospel. The economic analyses
on carbon taxation provide policymakers with pages for a
playbook of policy considerations. Along with those 
economic considerations are political ones, and reaching
political decisions requires a judicious mixing of all of them.
A core argument of this Article is a call for a sophisticated,
but critical appreciation for the economic impacts of carbon
taxation. That revenue uses are political is beyond doubt.
But making decisions about revenue absolutely requires the 
input of economic analysis.
Part of what makes climate policy so contentious is the 
concentration of job losses in particular industries and in
particular regions. While most economic analysis suggests
that fossil fuel job losses will be roughly matched by
employment gains in renewable energy, efficiency, and 
public transportation,167 one cannot overlook the fact that
those gains would not necessarily be realized by those who 
lose their jobs in fossil fuel industries like coal mining. In 
al., Vertical and Horizontal Redistributions from a Carbon Tax and Rebate 19 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23250, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941404.
166. Id. at 7.
167. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
   
       
     
      
        
       
       
         
     
      
     
        
      
       
       
     
       
        
      
     
       
      
      
      
     
 
             
             
         
            
    
 
         
      
           
           
   
       
        
8972017] CARBON TAXATION
terms of winners applauding and losers screaming, coal
miners are already screaming, and loudly.168 
Option Seven seeks to soften the blow to individuals
and households in regions dependent upon a fossil fuel-
based economy for whom climate policy poses the greatest
threat. Dislocated coal mine workers, for example, would
not simply suffer higher costs of energy and goods; they
would need assistance to relocate and find new
employment. Moreover, when communities dependent upon
fossil fuel exploitation wither, members of those 
communities lose their social capital, which is often their
only buffer against economic hardship.169 These groups
focus their political power by singular commitment to 
opposing the thing that would ruin them: climate policy.
It has therefore been suggested that climate policy
include something for industries, regions, and communities
dependent upon fossil fuel usage, if not out of obligation,
then at least out of a strategic desire to improve the 
political acceptability of climate policy.170 Retraining
individual workers would seem to go the farthest in terms
of addressing concerns with economic dislocation.171 Taking
into account the needs of individuals and households in
these vulnerable groups and communities is, from this
perspective, nothing more than another aspect of 
168. Those in the coal industry have turned to complaining that President
Obama’s policies amounted to a “war on coal,” even if low natural gas prices
have had a much greater effect. Ronald Bailey, Natural Gas Ambush Killed of
Coal Mining Industry, Not Obama’s ‘War on Coal,’ REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG
(Oct. 11, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2016/10/11/natural-gas-
ambush-killed-off-coal-minin.
169. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 359 (2000) (“Historically social capital has been the main 
weapon of the have-nots, who lacked other forms of capital.”); James M.
Acheson, The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy, 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 385, 385–86 (1985).
170. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 107.
171. See MORRIS, supra note 107, at 20.
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regressiveness: concern about poor individuals hurt by
higher fuel costs should logically extend to individuals
displaced by loss of income and social capital.
Retraining programs would need to be part of a larger,
more comprehensive program. There is no point in
retraining individuals for non-existent jobs. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics reports that about 53,000 workers are 
employed by the coal industry,172 making a transition of 
that scope worthy of considerable thought and planning. A 
more comprehensive and thoughtful effort would redevelop
the economy of entire regions.
Another possible use for carbon tax revenues is to use 
some of the revenues to further support, through subsidies,
low-carbon or non-carbon technologies. Most economists are 
critical of linking a carbon tax to subsidies for fossil fuel
alternatives, in effect duplicating efforts to price the 
external costs of greenhouse gas emissions. Most energy
subsidies are economically inefficient anyway,173 so that
such a “belt-and-suspenders” approach to shifting energy
away from fossil fuels and toward low- or non-carbon
sources is a less elegant and potentially more wasteful
approach than setting a carbon tax price trajectory
sufficient to drive innovation and displace fossil fuels.174 
On the other hand, some economists also recognize that
fossil fuel industries have an enormous head start over
alternative, low- or non-carbon technologies, and would
172. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., MAY 2016 NATIONAL INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES: COAL MINING (2016),
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_212100.htm#00-0000.
173. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD: ISSUES 
FOR 2014 AND BEYOND 3, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-
2013-2014/reports/45477-Biofuels2.pdf.
174. See MARRON & MORRIS supra note 71, at 10.
   
   
        
     
       
      
         
       
        
     
       
        
      
       
         
     
        
      
      
       
       
 
             
 
          
      
 
           
 
          
       
 
              
            
     
 




therefore support some modest subsidization of these 
upstart industries.175 Having evolved for over a century,
incumbent fossil fuel-based industries enjoy huge 
advantages in terms of scale economies and research and
development infrastructure, which might not be completely
overcome by a carbon tax.176 But engaging in this kind of 
“catch-up” subsidization runs the risks of locking in certain
technologies, just as fossil fuel subsidies have done for fossil
fuels, so some caution would seem to be warranted.177 
A final option, given the challenges of choosing wisely
how to spend money on climate-related objectives, is to just
consider carbon tax proceeds as another source of 
revenue.178 In the United States, roads, highways and
bridges as well as public transportation systems teeter on
the brink of collapse, starved for funding because the 
federal gasoline tax is not indexed for inflation, and
Congress has not mustered the courage to increase it in
twenty-four years.179 American public education seems to be 
in perpetual crisis. Many sewage treatment plants in the 
United States have not been updated for generations.180 A 
175. See Daron Acemoglu et al., Transition to Clean Technology, 124 J. POL.
ECON. 52, 100–01 (2014).
176. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Transitioning: An International Human
Capital Strategy for Climate Innovation, 6 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 153, 153–76 
(2017).
177. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Rigidities, Latent Externalities, 51 HOUS. L.
REV. 719, 738–39 (2014).
178. See MAI FARID ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, AFTER PARIS: FISCAL,
MACROECONOMIC, AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1601.pdf.
179. See Jerome Dumortier et al., State and Federal Fuel Taxes: The Road
Ahead for U.S. Infrastructure Funding 16 (Ind. Univ. Sch. of Pub. & Envtl.
Affairs, Working Paper No. 2016-1, 2016), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/233758/2/IU%20SPEA%20AgEcon%20Papers%202016-1.pdf.
180. See KEITH MILLER ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW TO UPGRADE OUR 
NATION’S WASTEWATER AND DRINKING-WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 7 (2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/MillerWaterInfrastructureReport.pdf.
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multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure backlog awaits.181 And 
lest we forget, mandated spending programs such as Social
Security and Medicare consume fully two-thirds of the 
federal budget182 and continue to weigh on budgetary
decisions. It is even worth considering using carbon tax
proceeds to pay down federal governmental debt. Fully two-
thirds of U.S. federal debt is held by institutional investors
and other private investors,183 so that the roughly six
percent of the federal budget dedicated to interest
payments is a transfer from American taxpayers to 
investors. None of these uses are an inherently poor use of 
carbon tax revenues.
Some of these considerations might not seem so 
politically implausible if a state level carbon tax was under
consideration. State government spending priorities might
be less suspicious and more pressing than federal ones. The 
State of Washington is currently under a contempt order
from its own supreme court, stemming from the case 
McCleary v. State,184 to discharge a state constitutional
obligation to fully fund uniform public education. In a 2012
ruling, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the 
State “failed to meet its duty under article IX, section 1 by
consistently providing school districts with a level of 
resources that falls short of the actual costs of the basic
education program.”185 In 2015, after giving the state 
181. See 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y CIV.
ENGINEERS (March 20, 2014), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013ReportCardforAmericasInfrastructure.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2CUY-F6QQ].
182. Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, NAT’L PRIORITIES PROJECT, 
https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spending/
(Fig. 1) (last visited June 11, 2017).
183. See Federal Spending: Borrowing and the Federal Debt, NAT’L PRIORITIES
PROJECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/
borrowing-and-federal-debt/ (last visited June 11, 2017).
184. McCleary v. State, 173 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012).
185. Id. at 261.
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legislature several opportunities to present a funding plan,
the supreme court found the state in contempt and ordered
the payment of $100,000 per day for every day that the 
state remained in violation. As part of the order, the 
Washington State Supreme Court directed the state to 
identify “dependable and regular” funding sources.186 
What would it take for Washington State to embrace a
carbon tax as a source of revenue for funding public
education? That requires political tea-leaf reading skills
beyond the ability of this author. But it surely seems worth
imagining that such a proposition sounds less crazy at the 
state level than it would at a federal level.
IV. CARBON FEE AND DIVIDEND 
All of this only begs the political, values-based question:
apart from reducing emissions, what should the secondary
purpose of a carbon tax be? Should it reduce inequality, or
should it boost economic growth? One answer to this
question is try and minimize the prominence of this
secondary purpose. One way to do that is to rebate carbon
tax proceeds back to carbon taxpayers, in a lump sum
distribution.
The idea of returning carbon tax proceeds as a lump
sum distribution to all households did not originate with 
the group Citizens’ Climate Lobby, but certainly its
continuing and dogged advocacy over a period of years has
pushed the lump sum distribution idea to the climate policy
fore.187 The CCL proposal, which it calls “fee and dividend,”
186. McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) (discussing order
of contempt).
187. See, e.g., Susan Phillips, Climate Activists Court Hill Republicans with
'Civil Conversations,' NPR (June 14, 2017, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2017/06/14/532969087/climate-caucus-successfully-courts-more-congressional-
republicans. The author is a member of the Citizens’ Climate Lobby Advisory
Board.
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is to collect a carbon tax, initially set at $10 per ton but 
increasing each year by $10 per ton, and distribute the 
revenues in lump sum distributions to each household.188 
Distributions are given on a per adult basis, plus a half-
share for each child, up to two children, so that a household
is essentially one, two, or three adults.189 Carbon taxes are 
collected by a dedicated trust instrument bound to rebate 
all revenues minus administrative costs, which CCL has
rather pessimistically estimated at seven to eight percent of 
revenues.190 CCL avoids the word “tax”—which would imply
a potential government-spending purpose—and instead
uses the term “fee.” A supporter of the concept, former
Secretary of State George P. Schultz (who, as noted above,
propounded his own similar proposal in February) said, 
“[i]t’s not a tax if the government doesn’t keep the 
money.”191 
Such dedicated instruments have precedents. Sovereign
wealth funds are generally trust instruments insulated
from legislative interference, such as the Alaska Permanent
Fund Corporation, which was constitutionally chartered to 
receive oil royalties collected by the State, and either
distribute them to Alaskans or invest them in mostly 
income-producing investments.192 The basic idea is to 
188. For the Citizens’ Climate Lobby proposal, see Legislative Proposal:
Carbon Fee and Dividend, CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY, 
https://citizensclimatelobby.org/carbon-fee-and-dividend/ (last visited June 11,
2017) (advocating for a “carbon free and dividend” since at least 2014).
189. Id.
190. See Administrative Costs of Carbon Fee and Dividend, CITIZENS’ CLIMATE
LOBBY, https://citizensclimatelobby.org/administrative-cost/ (last visited June
11, 2017).
191. 5 Conservatives Arguing for a Price on Carbon, CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://citizensclimatelobby.org/5-conservatives-arguing-price-
carbon/.
192. See What is the Alaska Permanent Fund?, ALA. PERMANENT FUND CORP., 
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm (last visited
June 11, 2017).
   
      
       
  
      
      
       
      
      
      
        
        
   
      
     
    
         
      
      
     
    
      
      
      
      
        
 
            
         
         
       
       
         
       
         
9032017] CARBON TAXATION
ensure that revenues are not commingled with other
sources of revenue, which could be used for some other
legislative purpose.193 
A. A Macroeconomic Appraisal 
The RFF study placed lump sum distribution at the 
bottom of the list of four revenue uses in terms of 
macroeconomic efficiency, the intuition being that with all
of the distortionary taxes that could be reduced, using the 
money to give directly back to people is a relatively
ineffective way of generating economic activity and growth.
This comes with the caveat that conventional CGE models
might not accurately reflect decisions made in this current,
ahistorical economic climate.194 
The economic study commissioned by CCL is, perhaps
unsurprisingly, considerably more sanguine. As noted
above, the economic analysis of the CCL fee-and-dividend
proposal assumes that capital outflows can be limited by an
enforceable border tax adjustment,195 as contrasted with
the RFF assumption that a carbon tax would drive 
investment dollars abroad to jurisdictions free of carbon
taxation.196 The CCL-commissioned study also takes into 
account the co-benefits of reducing coal use in the form of 
fewer premature deaths from air pollution.197 Putting these 
critical assumptions together, along with some other
modeling liberties, is enough for the CCL fee-and-dividend
proposal to show significant gains in GDP over time, on the 
193. See Stephen Jen, Sovereign Wealth Funds: What They Are and What’s
Happening, 8 WORLD ECON. 1, 1 (2007) (“A SWF is a government investment
vehicle that invests in foreign currency denominated assets and whose
management is distinct from that of official reserves.”).
194. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
195. See NYSTROM & LUCKOW, supra note 138, at 17.
196. CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY, supra note 137.
197. NYSTROM & LUCKOW, supra note 138, at 2.
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order of a half a percent in the long term.198 
Certainly, the decision in the CCL study to account for
other environmental harms of reduced coal usage is entirely
appropriate. The linkage between coal combustion and
cardiopulmonary disease and death is now indisputable,199 
so a policy that reduces coal usage should be credited with
indirectly, but clearly, saving lives. It also seems more 
justifiable for the CCL study to assume the existence of a
border tax adjustment consistent with international trade 
law, than it is for the RFF study to assume none. While the 
literature is maddeningly inconclusive,200 the more 
plausible, albeit less cautious, assumption is that some 
enforceable form of a border tax adjustment would survive 
WTO scrutiny, and that carbon tax-induced capital flows to 
carbon tax-free jurisdictions would be minimal.
In conclusion, it seems safe to say that a fixation on the 
effects of a carbon tax on GDP is not likely to provide much
guidance. Given the economic and legal uncertainties, there 
is no good reason to elevate macroeconomic considerations
above other ones in assessing carbon taxation. Moreover,
198. Id. at 21.
199. See, e.g., Johanna Lepeule, et al., Chronic Exposure to Fine Particles and
Mortality: An Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study from 1974 to
2009, 120 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 965, 970 (2012); Francine Laden et al., 
Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality: Extended Follow-up 
of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED.
667, 669–71 (2006); C. Arden Pope III et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary
Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1132, 1136 (2002); C. Arden Pope III et al., Particulate Air Pollution
as a Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 669, 672–73 (1995); Douglas W. Dockery et
al., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1756–59 (1993); HEALTH EFFECTS INST., SPECIAL 
REPORT: REANALYSIS OF THE HARVARD SIX CITIES STUDY AND THE AMERICAN
CANCER SOCIETY STUDY OF PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION AND MORTALITY 90 (JULY
2000) http://pubs.healtheffects.org/view.php?id=6 
200. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 48 (2009); Bankes et al., supra note 141, at 413–15;
Pauwelyn, supra note 141, at 48–49.
   
      
       
        
      
     
     
      
      
      
       
          
       
       
       
     
       
      
   
    
         
           
     
    
     
      
      
     
 
          
           
       
     
            
       
9052017] CARBON TAXATION
CGE models seem to confirm the intuition that what
amounts to a small redistribution—on the order of a few
hundred dollars from a rich household to a poor one—will 
not wreak the widespread economic havoc that climate 
skeptics have been warning us about.
B. Some Distributional Considerations 
The absence of widespread economic havoc does not
imply the absence of localized economic havoc. Certainly, a
reduction in coal usage would lead to the continued decline 
of coal-producing regions. That would certainly be an
important political consideration, except for one curious and
shocking thing: a carbon tax with a lump sum distribution
would, on the whole, benefit most households in those 
regions dependent on coal production. Both the RFF and
CCL-commissioned models show net gains for most
households in the Appalachian region.201 The RFF study
shows small declines for the heavily coal-dependent states
of West Virginia and Kentucky, but because the losses are 
concentrated in the highest-income households, the 
majority of households in those states—the poorest three 
quintiles—actually are better off in a world with a carbon
tax with a lump sum distribution.202 That is not to say all of 
the households in the lowest three quintiles are better off. 
There is likely considerable heterogeneity within those 
large groups, but on average those demographics benefit.
Recall, too, that the RFF model incorporates the somewhat
crabbed assumption that capital is free to flee the United
States in search of carbon tax-free jurisdictions.203 
201. See Kevin Ummel, Impact of CCL’s Proposed Carbon Fee and Dividend
Policy: A High-Resolution Analysis of the Financial Effect on U.S. Households
29 (Int’l Inst. Applied Sys. Analysis, Working Paper v1.3, 2016),
https://citizensclimatelobby.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Household-Impact-
Study-Ummel.pdf; WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 120, at 14–22.
202. See WILLIAMS III ET AL., supra note 120, at 19 (Fig. 4).
203. CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY, supra note 137.
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The intuition behind this surprising result is that a
lump sum distribution approach, as noted above, is
progressive.204 For the poorest households, the lump sum
distribution is likely to be larger than the increases in
energy costs. The fee-and-dividend approach thus effects a
small wealth transfer from rich households to poor ones. In
the Appalachians, the distribution is apt to be so valuable 
to households in addressing immediate needs that the 
economic boost overwhelms the job losses. Moreover, job
losses in those regions are already high due to a variety of 
economic factors, not the least of which is low natural gas
prices.205 While a carbon tax adds insult to injury, its actual 
contribution to the region’s woes would be small. Coal usage 
has plummeted so quickly and sharply that the declines
have surpassed the reductions originally projected to occur
under the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, a full 
five years before it was due to take effect.206 Coal is dying,
and policy is largely irrelevant. Viewed in that light, a 
carbon fee-and-dividend, aiding as it does the poorest, is a
salve and not a curse for aggrieved Appalachians.
C. A Political Appraisal 
Apart from addressing regressiveness and other
distributional concerns, the lump sum approach has other
political advantages. First, it addresses the concern that a
carbon tax or climate policy would “grow” government. The 
point of a separate dedicated instrument is to guarantee
that the carbon fees are collected, and returned. Second, it
is a revenue recycling option that is guaranteed to remain
204. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
205. See Walter J. Culver & Mingguo Hong, Coal’s Decline: Driven by Policy
or Technology? 29 ELEC. J. 50, 51 (2016); Bailey, supra note 168.
206. Annalee Armstrong, Coal Generation Drop in 2015 Beats EPA’s Clean
Power Plan Expectations, SNL ENERGY (Jan. 9, 2017, 10:24 AM),
https://www.snl.com/Cache/snlpdf_e86c249b-d67e-4d8e-9e18-3ecb89a7fbb7.pdf.
   
    
        
        
        
       
 
      
      
         
       
     
    
        
         
     
         
           
     
        
       
   
      
        
    
      
        
      
     
     
     
      
   
     
     
 
       
9072017] CARBON TAXATION
revenue neutral, as the only disbursements made are those 
collected as carbon fees. Recycling revenues by reducing
income taxes, sales taxes, or other taxes with uncertain
collections, runs the risk of a significant net revenue loss or
gain, introducing a potential political and economic
complication.207 
There is one last subtle, but critically important
advantage to the lump sum distribution approach: a carbon
tax with a lump sum distribution provides a climate policy
in which the risk of rent-seeking, while not eliminated, is at
least minimized. The basic components of the fee and
dividend approach are so simple and straightforward, so 
cabined off from other policies, that an attempt to rent-seek
would painfully obvious. If a carbon tax (or “fee”) is going to 
be collected, carbon taxpayers are going to be very
interested in how that money is spent. An attempt to rent-
seek on the back of a carbon tax would run up against a
suspicious and highly motivated carbon tax-paying 
electorate. The lump sum distribution option is a way of 
reducing the number of political objectives a single one: a
modest wealth redistribution.
Of all of the potential political objectives that could be 
addressed by carbon tax revenues, the one that would seem
to generate the loudest applause and the least screaming
would be the small wealth redistributions modeled by the 
RFF and CCL studies, among others. Addressing as it does
the impacts on coal-producing regions by helping the 
poorest, the fee-and-dividend approach offers the simplest
single political objective, and the best chance to isolate that
single objective. For potential legislative sponsors actually
interested in good, simple policy, fee-and-dividend offers the 
opportunity to make one small positive change in climate 
policy. The incentive for those lawmakers would be to fend
off attempts to inject rent-seeking into a fee-and-dividend.
207. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
      
       
 
      
       
        
      
      
        
      
        
     
      
      
     
        
  
      
       
   
      
       
      
        
      
 
           
   
            
    
       
     
             
      
    
     
908 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
Once a climate policy is held hostage to one thing, it will be 
hostage to everything.
V. A FINAL, FISCAL WILD CARD 
In the midst of the 2008–09 financial crisis, much
discussion at the federal level focused on how to stimulate 
economic activity in a recession veering dangerously toward
a becoming full-blown, catastrophic depression.208 Economic
activity is highly relational; if large, systemically-important
sectors and populations withdraw from economic activity, it
can discourage other sectors and populations from
transacting as well, in turn further dampening economic
activity. Economists across the political spectrum favored
an injection of government spending to jump-start economic
activity, and arrest the downward spiral of economic
malaise that was beginning to take hold.209 The question
was exactly how the U.S. government was going to spend
money to stimulate the economy.
Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics,
the research arm of the credit rating giant, authored a
report and testified before the Senate Finance Committee 
comparing the impacts on U.S. GDP of different ways to 
inject money into the economy.210 For each option, Zandi
estimated how much of a short-term (one year) increase in
GDP would occur for every dollar spent by the federal
government.211 The options included not only outright
208. For an account, see TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON 
FINANCIAL CRISES (2014).
209. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Stimulus Plan We Need Now, WASH.
POST (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2008/10/29/AR2008102903198.html (Feldstein is a conservative economist who
served the three previous Republican presidents).
210. See The Economic Outlook and Stimulus Options: Hearing Before the S.
Budget Comm., 110th Cong. 18–30 (2008) (written testimony of Mark Zandi,
chief economist and cofounder of Moody’s Economy.com).
211. Id. at 27.
   
        
     
       
 
        
      
      
   
 
 
    
      
     
     
     
    
    
   
 
      
  
 
     
 
 
      
   
 
        
     
       
 
   
   
9092017] CARBON TAXATION
expenditures, but de facto expenditures in the form of tax
cuts and other forbearances in revenue collections.212 Table 
1 lists the options, in decreasing order of effectiveness.
TABLE 1. Capital Injection Options in the U.S. Economy213 
Policy Fiscal "Bang For the Buck"




Increase Infrastructure Spending 1.59
General Aid to State Governments 1.38
Temporary Payroll Tax Holiday 1.29
Refundable Lump-Sum Tax Rebate 1.22
Temporary Across-the-Board Tax Cut 1.03
Non-refundable Lump-Sum Rebate 1.01
Permanent Extension of Alternative 0.49
Minimum Tax Patch
Make Dividend and Capital Gains Tax
Cuts Permanent
0.38
Make Bush Income Tax Cuts 0.31
Permanent
Cut in Corporate Tax Rate 0.30
Accelerated Depreciation 0.25
This list should not be confused with long-term
economic effectiveness. The effects of capital accumulation,
which would be best encouraged by the policies at the 
212. Id.
213. Id.
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bottom of that list, take considerably longer than the one-
year time frame used by Zandi, whose charge was to 
determine which tool would best provide the “shock
treatment” required in a dangerous economic slowdown.
The most effective measures—those at the top of the list – 
place money in the hands of consumers, especially poorer
households. Those at the bottom, which pump money into 
the hands of producers and potential capital investors, were 
projected to be the least effective, at least in the short term.
While this short-term analysis by Zandi does not
substitute for long-term economic analysis, it is surely
worth remembering that this period following the financial
crisis has seen corporations hoarding cash, and not
spending money on investments, and therefore job creation.
And do the short-term shock treatments, which happen to 
benefit poor households, provide any long-term economic
benefit? That is a question that could easily divide Nobel
Laureates, and probably falls into that class of economic
questions that depend a fair bit on ideology. However, it 
seems important to avoid reifying certain pervasive (and
perhaps unavoidable) macroeconomic assumptions, because 
the political implications are so profound, and the 
justifications so tenuous.
CONCLUSION 
Carbon taxation can no longer be viewed in isolation as
a front-end cost, without considering potential back-end
benefits. The omission from previous works, including my
own book, The Case for a Carbon Tax,214 was in neglecting
to tie together the economic case for carbon taxation as a
climate policy, with a discussion of the uses to which carbon
tax revenues would be put. Choosing from among different
uses of carbon tax revenues is ineluctably a political choice 
214. HSU, supra note 20.
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with economic and distributional consequences. Without
this discussion, the unassailable merits of a carbon tax
cannot be sensibly translated into policy.
Interest and industry groups have sought to reinforce 
the negative connotations with the word “tax” by
obfuscating the revenues considerations of using carbon tax
proceeds, and essentially assuming them away.215 Such 
assumptions are actually worse than assuming that the 
money is spent on something wasteful, like the proverbial
Alaskan bridge to nowhere—at least that money would be 
essentially gifted to a construction industry and its
workers, who would thereafter spend it, re-injecting some of 
that wasted money into the economy. It is obvious why
these groups make such an outlandish assumption: there is
much good that can be done with carbon tax proceeds, in
most cases more than compensating for the economic costs
of a carbon tax, even without taking into account the 
benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the risks
of climate change. Carbon taxation is the camel’s nose that
threatens to completely upend the comfortable fossil fuel-
centered energy policy tent, and allowing that carbon tax
revenues can be useful is to allow that nose to enter.
Bearing in mind the built-in assumptions of CGE
models, it is clear that the dire predictions of a carbon tax
destroying or even seriously damaging the U.S. economy
are nonsense. Thoughtful design might actually result in
something close to a no-cost or very low-cost policy.
Moreover, if one assumes even modest economic benefits
from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and conventional
co-pollutants, the economic case for a carbon tax becomes
overwhelming.
Carbon tax revenues can potentially serve political
purposes and/or economic purposes, with those two types of 
objectives potentially at odds, but quite possibly not.
215. See sources cited supra note 24.
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Conventional modeling assumptions would suggest that
carbon tax revenues are best used to reduce some 
distortionary taxes such as corporate income taxes, capital
gains taxes, and perhaps income taxes. However, the 
political climate in the United States is such that inequality
is currently a salient concern. The more politically
palatable use of revenues would be to reverse the regressive 
effects of carbon taxation, and address a variety of 
inequality concerns. These are not commonly thought
among economists to be economically efficient, but enough
economic uncertainty exists so that this bit of postulation is
fair game for debate. Taking political and economic
concerns together, there would appear to be more net
political gains to be had by orienting carbon tax revenues
towards poorer households, and adopting the lump sum
distribution, or fee-and-dividend approach.
Towards that end, a carbon fee-and-dividend approach
is promising in that it carries a small amount of political
baggage. Redistributions are political red meat for some 
conservatives, but that is only an ideological flashpoint,
devoid of any empirical heft. Assigning a number to that
redistribution—on the order of $1,000 per household— 
defuses the rhetorical power of this argument. There is
moreover good reason to suspect that the real costs are 
lower still, as the conditions have rarely been more ripe for
consumer spending to take the lead in stimulating economic
activity. The fact that conventional economic modeling
assumptions may not adequately account for this historical
anomaly should not be a bar to a fairly modest economic
experiment, especially if it reduces the risks of climate 
change.
And finally, to repeat a theme of this Article, many of 
the political taboos at the federal level are less formidable 
at the state level, so that the merits of a carbon tax may be 
more relevant for states. State spending is dominated by
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public secondary education, public higher education,
transportation, and Medicaid,216 bread-and-butter programs
that resonate even in a toxic political environment. To tax
greenhouse gas emissions to fund these uses would be 
considerably more plausible than would be many federal
spending programs. Climate policy in the era of Trump
might, after all, see the introduction of carbon taxation in
the United States.
216. See NAT’L ASS’N STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT:
EXAMINING FISCAL 2014–2016 STATE SPENDING 7 (2016), http://www.nasbo.org/
reports-data/state-expenditure-report/state-expenditure-archives.
